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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DORA SCHREITER, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
WASATCH MANOR, INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 920573-CA 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT 
DORA SCHREITER 
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT 
ON APRIL 22, 1992 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant Dora Schreiter brings this appeal from the 
decision of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah wherein summary judgment was entered 
against the appellant on April 22, 1992. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
AND THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the plaintifffs burden of proof in opposing 
the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment include presenting 
evidence on the cost of installing a sprinkler system at Wasatch 
Manor? The Court reviews this issue using a de novo standard. 
Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
2. Did the plaintifffs burden of proof in opposing 
the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment include presenting 
evidence of the financial ability of Wasatch Manor to pay for the 
cost of installing the sprinkler system? The Court reviews this 
issue using a de novo standard. Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 
(Utah 1989). 
3. In the event the response to issues one and two is 
affirmative, did the plaintiff present prima facie evidence on 
the cost of a sprinkler system and the economic ability of the 
defendant to install it? The Court reviews this issue using a de 
novo standard. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
4. Did the Court properly exclude under Rule 407, 
Utah Rules of Evidence testimony from Burton Miller, the manager 
of Wasatch Manor, of the fact that after the February 7, 1990 
fire the defendant obtained an estimate for installing a 
sprinkler system of between $185,000 and $200,000 at Wasatch 
Manor? This Court reviews this issue using a de novo standard. 
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
The following rules are determinative in this appeal: 
U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c). 
. . . The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on 
file together with the affidavits, 
if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law. . .. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 407 titled "Subsequent Remedial Measures" 
When, after an event, measures are 
taken which, if taken previously, 
would have made the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of the 
subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence or 
culpable conduct in connection with 
the event. This rule does not 
require the exclusion of evidence 
of subsequent measures when offered 
for another purpose, such as 
proving ownership, control, or 
feasibility of precautionary 
measures, if controverted, or 
impeachment. 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E C A S E 
A. Nature of the case 
On February 7, 1990, Appellant (hereafter "Schreiter") 
was an 83-year old woman who lived on the tenth floor of a high-
rise retirement complex, Wasatch Manor. Early on the morning of 
February 7, 1990, she awoke to see flames outside of her window 
and smell smoke in her apartment. A fire had started in the room 
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of another tenant on the same floor when he fell asleep while 
smoking in bed. Schreiter sustained permanent and disabling 
injuries due to smoke inhalation from the fire. Her medical 
expenses exceed $50,000. Although she ultimately recovered to 
some extent from her injuries, she is nevertheless left with a 
significant degree of permanent disability from the fire. 
At the time of the fire, Wasatch Manor had no sprinkler 
system installed. The Uniform Building Code in effect at the 
time Wasatch Manor was constructed did not require a sprinkler 
system. However, Wasatch Manor is an eleven story building 
designed to serve as a retirement home for the elderly. In 
addition, Wasatch Manor permitted and was aware of smoking within 
the building and required that individuals smoking do so in their 
rooms rather than the common areas. Wasatch Manorfs manager was 
concerned about the potential fire hazard smokers posed to the 
building and to other tenantfs safety. 
Schreiter brought a claim against Wasatch Manor based 
on negligence for failing to remedy or mitigate a foreseeable 
hazard when they did not retrofit the building with a sprinkler 
system. The defendant moved for summary judgment, claiming that 
Schreiter bore the burden of proof to show both the cost of 
installing a sprinkler system at the building and the financial 
ability of the defendant to pay for such a and that she had 
failed to produce prima facie evidence on both points. The Court 
granted the Motion for Summary Judgment and an Order to that 
effect was entered on May 22, 1992. 
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B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition. 
A trial date was originally set for this case on May 
11, 1992. However, due to difficulty in obtaining expert 
testimony as to the degree to which sprinklers would have been 
effective in limiting the spread of the fire at Wasatch Manor, 
Schreiter moved to continue trial of the case approximately one 
month before the trial date and before the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was filed. The Motion to Continue Trial was 
granted in a telephone conference between the Court and counsel 
on Thursday, April 30, 1982. 
The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was filed 
on April 23, 1992. Following the submission of briefs in support 
and in opposition to the motion the matter came on for hearing 
before the Court on May 8, 1992. The Court ruled on the motion 
at the end of the hearing and the Order granting the motion was 
entered on May 22, 1992. Schreiter filed her Notice of Appeal on 
June 18, 1992. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Sometime in the early morning of February 7, 1990, 
a fire broke out on the tenth floor of Wasatch Manor Retirement 
Home. Plaintifffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, R.440, paragraph 1. 
2. Dora Schreiter, a 83-year old resident of Wasatch 
Manor, resided on the tenth floor at the time the fire broke out. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R.440, paragraph 2. 
5 
3* Wasatch Manor is an 11-story apartment building 
with the majority of its tenants being retired elderly people. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 3. 
4. The fire started in the room of Gerald O'Hara, 
another tenant of Wasatch Manor who also lived on the tenth floor 
of the building. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 4. 
5. The fire started when Mr. O'Hara fell asleep while 
smoking in bed. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 5. 
6. At the time of the fire Wasatch Manor had no 
sprinkler system installed on the tenth floor in the building. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 6. 
7. The Uniform Building Code in effect at the time 
Wasatch Manor was constructed did not require a sprinkler system 
for the building. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 7. 
8. Wasatch Manor did not require non-ambulatory 
retired individuals to leave the building. Each tenant made 
their own determination about whether they left the retirement 
home when they became non-ambulatory. Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.441, 
paragraph 8. 
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9. Smoking is permitted in the building except in the 
common areas and Wasatch Manor is aware of smokers living in the 
building. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, R.441# paragraph 9. 
10. Wasatch Manor has specifically indicated to its 
tenants that if they smoke they should stay in their apartments. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R.441, paragraph 10. 
11. The manager of Wasatch Manor was concerned about 
the fact that the tenants smoking in the building posed a 
potential fire hazard. The concern of the manager of Wasatch 
Manor was not only for the individuals' health but for the 
potential fire hazard to the tenants in the building. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R.442, paragraph 11. 
12. After the fire, the manager of Wasatch Manor 
observed that the condition of the tenth floor was "devastated, 
pretty well burned-out." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.442, paragraph 12. 
13. After the fire Wasatch Manor received an estimate 
for the cost of installing a sprinkler system in the building in 
the general area of $185,000 to $200,000. Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.442, 
paragraph 13. 
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14. Wasatch Manor remodeled the their building in 1984 
for the cost of approximately $500,000. Plaintiff's Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.442, 
paragraph 14. 
15. As part of the remodeling, the patios on the tenth 
floor were sealed in with windows. Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.442, 
paragraph 15. 
16. The cost of cleaning up the building from the 
February 7, 1990 fire was approximately $350,000. Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R.442, paragraph 16; Exhibit "A", R.449-450. 
17. The nature of Schreiter's injuries was primarily 
damage to her lungs from smoke inhalation. Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R.442, paragraph 17. 
18. The medical expenses for Schreiter exceed $50,000. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, R.442, paragraph 18. 
19. Hearing on the Plaintiff's Motion to Continue the 
Trial Date in the case was held by telephonic conference on 
Thursday, April 30, 1992, at 9:00 a.m. At that time the Court 
agreed to continue the trial date in the case. Notice of Hearing 
dated April 24, 1992, R.368-369; Minute Entry, R.439; Order on 
Motion to Continue, dated June 1, 1992, R.489-490. 
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20. At oral argument on the defendants Motion for. 
Summary Judgment on May 8, 1992 the defendant agreed that a fire 
sprinkler system at Wasatch Manor would have been effective in 
limiting the scope and extent of the fire. The Motion for 
\Summary Judgment was presented solely on the questions as to 
whether the plaintiff was required to show as an element of her 
proof (1) the cost of installing a sprinkler system and (2) the 
ability of Wasatch Manor to pay for those costs and whether such 
proof was presented. Order dated May 22, 1992, R.484, paragraph 
2; R.485, paragraph 6; and R.486, paragraph 2. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Of the four standard elements of a plaintiff's burden 
of proof in a negligence case, the defendant challenged in their 
Motion for Summary Judgment only the first two, the existence of 
a duty on the part of Wasatch Manor and the breach of that duty. 
Based on all the circumstances surrounding the event, Schreiter 
presented prima facie evidence on which a jury could impose a 
duty on Wasatch Manor to install a sprinkler system. In 
addition, Schreiter presented evidence of the specific cost of 
installing a fire sprinkler system in the building. The Court 
erred in excluding this evidence under Rule 407 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
The Court also erred in requiring that as part of her 
prima facie case Schreiter prove that Wasatch Manor had the 
ability to pay for the cost of installing a sprinkler system. 
Proof of financial ability to instill what a jury may find as a 
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reasonable precautionary safety measure is not part of the 
plaintiff's prima facie case but is, at best, a defense for the 
defendant to raise and prove. Moreover, Schreiter did present 
information that sustained any prima facie burden of proof that 
may have existed to show that the defendant had the assets to 
install such a sprinkler system. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE SCOPE OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
LIMITED TO CHALLENGING WHETHER THE PLAINTIFF HAD PRESENTED A 
PRIMA FACIE CASE ON THE EXISTENCE OF A DUTY AND A BREACH OF 
THAT DUTY BY WASATCH MANOR. 
In sustaining any negligence claim the plaintiff must 
show: "(1) a duty of reasonable care owed by the defendant to 
plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty, (3) the causation, both 
actually and proximately, of injury; and (4) the suffering of 
damages by the plaintiff." Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723,726 
(Utah 1985). 
The last two elements of Schreiter's prima facie were 
not contested in the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment. As 
for damages, no one has ever suggested the Dora Schreiter was not 
severely injured as a result of the Wasatch Manor fire. With 
regard to actual and proximate cause, the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment initially contained an argument that Schreiter 
had not presented a prima facie case showing a link between the 
harm suffered by Schreiter and the lack of a fire sprinkler 
system at Wasatch Manor. Schreiter disputed this. However, at 
the oral argument of the case on May 8, 1992, the defendant 
conceded that for purposes of the Motion for Summary Judgment 
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causation was not an issue. R.484, Paragraph 2; R.485, paragraph 
6; R.486, paragraph 2. The parties accordingly did not address 
the actual and proximate cause issue in oral argument nor did the 
Court base its ruling to any extent on a finding or conclusion 
that actual and proximate cause had not been demonstrated. 
R.483-488. Consequently, the scope of this Court's review should 
be limited to whether the Court erred in determining that 
Schreiter failed to show a duty on the part of the defendant and 
a breach of that duty. 
II. SCHREITER HAS PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CASE AS TO THE 
EXISTENCE OF A DUTY ON THE PART OF WASATCH MANOR AND A 
BREACH OF THAT DUTY. 
A. Applicable Legal Principles relating to Summary 
Judgment. 
Utah case law is replete with references that summary 
judgment should be granted with great caution in negligence 
cases. Williams v. Melbv. 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985). 
English v. Kienke. 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 (Utah App 1989).. This is 
because "issues of negligence ordinarily present questions of 
fact to be resolved by the fact finder." Apache Tank Lines, Inc. 
v. Cheney, 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985). Summary judgment is 
reserved for only the most clear cut negligence cases. Ingram v. 
Salt Lake Cityf 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) (per curiam). Another 
reason summary judgment should be granted in only the most 
obvious cases is that, as stated in Williams v. Melby, supra: 
Whether a defendant has breached 
the required standard of care is 
generally a question for the jury, 
to be determined by whether the 
injury which occurred was of the 
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type that fell within the zone of 
risk created by the defendant's 
negligent conduct. 'The care to be 
exercised in anv particular case 
depends upon the circumstances of 
that case and on the extent of 
foreseeable danger involved and 
must be determined as a question of 
fact.' 
Supra at 727, citations omitted, emphasis added, quoting DCR Inc. 
v. Peak Alarm Co, 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1985). 
The appellate court should view the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the losing party when facing the appeal of a summary 
judgment ruling. Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981). 
B. Whether Wasatch Manor had a duty to retrofit the 
building with a sprinkler system is a question of fact. 
A number of Utah cases have outlined standards of care 
and the duties required of landlords when tenants have been 
injured. Landlord liability is not limited by the categories 
established in common law, but the landlord's duty is to exercise 
reasonable care toward tenants in all circumstances. Williams, 
suprar at 726. Importantly, Williams holds that compliance with 
the Uniform Building Code does not preclude a finding of 
negligence on the part of a designer or owner of a building. 
Supra at 728. The Williams Court held that if a reasonably 
prudent landlord knew or should have known of a dangerous 
condition in a building despite compliance with building code, 
the landlord could be held liable for not taking adequate safety 
precautions. Id. 
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Williams relied to some extent on the case of Becker v. 
IRM Corp.. 698 P.2d 116 (Cal. 1985). In the Becker case a tenant 
brought a claim against his landlord when he suffered injuries 
after falling against untempered frosted glass in a shower door 
of an apartment he was leasing. He brought claims of strict 
liability and negligence. The trial court granted a defense 
motion for summary judgment on the basis that there was no duty 
to any injured tenant for a latent defect absent actual knowledge 
or a contractual or statutory duty. The California Supreme Court 
reversed on the basis that a genuine issue of fact existed. The 
Court stated: 
. . . A landlord in caring for his 
property must act toward his tenant 
as a reasonable person under all 
the circumstances, including the 
likelihood of injury, the probable 
seriousness of injury, the burden 
of reducing or avoiding the risk, 
and his degree of control over the 
risk-creating defect. 
Supra at 125. 
Likewise, the Court in Williams reversed the trial 
courtfs summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the basis 
that, despite complete compliance with the building code, a jury 
could still find the landlord negligent given all the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
Other cases in Utah echo the theme of Williams v. Melby 
that the existence of a duty on the part of a landlord is 
dependant upon the particular facts and circumstances of the 
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case. DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Company. 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 
1985). As stated in Erickson v. Wasatch Manor. Inc., 802 P.2d 
1323, 1327 (Utah App. 1990), the landlord of a building has a 
"duty to observe any dangerous condition known to him or which by 
the use of reasonably diligence would have become known to him 
and take reasonable steps to remedy or remove any such dangerous 
condition." Meece v. Briqham Young University» 639 P.2d 720, 723 
(Utah 1981) provides: 
Negligence is the failure to do what a 
reasonable and prudent person would have done 
under the circumstances or doing what such 
person under such circumstances would have 
done. The fault may be in acting or omitting 
to act. A corollary to that definition is 
the in the exercise of ordinary care, the 
amount of caution required may vary in 
accordance with the nature of the act and 
surrounding circumstances. 
The undisputed facts in the context of this particular 
case are that Wasatch Manor is an 11-story retirement home in 
which elderly people who may been limited in their ambulation 
live. Smokers are also in the building. These individuals are 
told they may not smoke in the common areas of the building and 
if they smoke they should do so in their apartments. The manager 
of Wasatch Manor admitted he was concerned about the tenantfs 
smoking endangering their own physical health and the safety of 
other individuals in the building. The threat of injury from a 
smokerfs cigarette lighting a bed on fire at night is clearly 
foreseeable. It is also foreseeable that individuals in the 
building may have significant difficulty in escaping this danger. 
The difficulty of fighting a fire from ladder trucks in a high 
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rise building is also common knowledge. This information 
combines to create an issue of fact as to the duty of Wasatch 
Manor and whether the failure to install a sprinkler system was a 
breach of that duty. 
C. To the extent necessary to fulfill Schreiter's prima 
facie obligation, admissible evidence exists to show 
the cost of installing a sprinkler system in the 
building. 
Schreiter has not only shown that a jury could 
reasonably find a duty to retrofit the building with a sprinkler 
system, she has presented prima facie evidence that such a 
precautionary measure is feasible. A key portion of the Court's 
ruling is that information presented by Schreiter through the 
defendant's building manager, Burton Miller, was inadmissible 
under Rule 407. Mr. Miller stated that after the fire Wasatch 
Manor obtained an estimate that the cost of retrofitting the 
building with a sprinkler system was $185,000 to $200,000. The 
Court ruled incorrectly that Rule 407 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence precluded such information from being presented to the 
jury. 
Rule 407 of the Utah Rules of Evidence is titled 
"Subsequent Remedial Measures" and states: 
When, after an event, measures are 
taken which, if taken previously, 
would have made the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of the 
subsequent measures is not 
admissible to prove negligence or 
culpable conduct in connection with 
the event. This rule does not 
require the exclusion of evidence 
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of subsequent measures when offered 
for another purpose, such as 
proving ownership, control, or 
feasibility of precautionary 
measures, if controverted, or 
impeachment. [emphasis added] 
Prohibiting presentation of this information was error for two 
reasons. First, obtaining the estimate for the installation of 
the sprinkler system was not a "subsequent remedial measure" as 
contemplated under the rule. By itself, the estimate itself is 
not a measure taken after the fire which, if obtained before 
February 7, 1990, would have made the fire less likely. As such, 
the estimate is not information that can be restricted under Rule 
407. 
Second, the Court ruled in its Order that the 
"feasibility exemption [under Rule 407] applies only if there is 
an issue as to whether or not the fire sprinkling system 
physically can be installed." R.487. This is clearly error. The 
plain language of Rule 407 does not limit the scope of the 
feasibility exemption in any such manner. There is no rational 
basis for allowing the feasibility exemption to be modified to 
include information directed to "mechanical" or "engineering" 
feasibility and exclude information relating to "financial" or 
"economic" feasibility. Cases from other jurisdictions 
interpreting the meaning of "feasibility" in this context have 
not limited it in the way the defendant argues. Reese v. Mercury 
Marine Division of Brunswick Corp, 793 F.2d 1416, 1428 (5th Cir. 
1986); Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corporation, 281 N.E.2d 749, 
753 (111. App. 1972). 
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In fact, the evidence Schreiter asked to admit through 
Burton Miller was the best evidence available on the cost of 
installing a sprinkler system in this particular building. It 
could easily have been presented in a way that completely removed 
any prejudicial effect to the defendant. The jury could have 
been told the actual cost of installing the system without regard 
to when the bid was obtained or from whom and to whom the 
information was provided. In light of such a simple way of 
accommodating the interests of both parties and also allow 
presentation of the most probative information to the jury, the 
Courtfs ruling must be overturned. 
D. Schreiter has no obligation as part of her prima 
facie case to present proof of Wasatch Manor's ability 
to pay the cost of installing the sprinkler system. 
The trial court similarly erred when it required 
Schreiter to show as part of its prima facie case that Wasatch 
Manor had the ability to pay for the costs of putting in a 
sprinkler system. In fact, if Wasatch Manor felt that due to 
financial constraints they were unable to provide a sprinkler 
system, this is an argument in the nature of a defense that 
Wasatch Manor bears the burden of presenting and proving. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 2a §288A(c)(1965). 
This is especially true in light of the fact that the 
question of what financial resources are available to the 
defendant is something only it knows of. It is an established 
tenet that where knowledge of a particular fact is within the 
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exclusive control of a defendant, that party rather than the 
plaintiff bears the burden of going forward with evidence on that 
issue. Pace v. Hvmas. 726 P.2d 693, 697 (Id. 1986). 
To adopt the defendant's position on this point would 
lead to absurd results and allow unscrupulous defendants to take 
advantage of victims of negligent acts. If the plaintiff is 
always required to prove that the defendant had the financial 
resources to install safety devices, defendants could insure that 
they escape liability by claiming poverty even in light of the 
most financially reasonable precautionary measures. 
E. In the event Schreiter has the burden of presenting 
prima facie evidence of financial ability to pay for 
the cost of the sprinkler system, she has satisfied her 
burden. 
Even if a burden does exist, a prima facie showing was 
presented by Schreiter to demonstrate that, in light of the 
tremendous expense associated with a devastating fire, a more 
than ample ability exists on the part of the defendant to pay the 
costs of retrofitting the building with a sprinkling system. 
Burton Miller, the building manager for the defendant, admitted 
in his deposition that six years before the fire the building was 
remodeled at a cost of approximately $500,000. Part of the work 
done on that remodeling was merely cosmetic. The bill for 
cleaning up after the fire was almost twice the estimate Miller 
obtained for an entire sprinkling system! It is difficult to 
believe under these circumstances that a jury does not have a 
basis to find the defendant had the financial capacity to install 
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a potential lifesaving sprinkling system to guard against the 
foreseeable devastating effects of a fire in a high-rise 
retirement home. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Order granting summary judgment is 
based entirely on the claim that Schreiter has failed to present 
a genuine issue of material fact about whether the defendant owed 
a duty to Schreiter and whether it breached that duty. Whether 
such a duty and breach exist is a factual question to be resolved 
by a jury in this case. The trial court wrongfully excluded 
evidence relating to the cost of a fire sprinkler system at 
Wasatch Manor. Under the facts of this case it is not 
Schreiterfs burden to show that the defendant's financial 
resources were sufficient to pay the cost of a sprinkler system. 
The Order granting summary judgment should be reversed and the 
case remanded for a trial before a jury. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 9th DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1992. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICES 
7i^—^ s, (c-
BRIAN S. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing 
APPELLATE COURT BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, on the 9th 
day of November, 1992, to the following: 
Gary Ferguson 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
247 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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GARY B. FERGUSON (A1062) 
Attorneys for Wasatch Manor 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 E. 200 S., Suite 500 
P.O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DORA SCHREITER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WASATCH MANOR, INC. 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 900907147 
Honorable Richard H. Moffatt 
Pursuant to proper notice, the defendant's First Motion 
in Limine and Motion for Summary Judgment came on before the 
Court with Brian S. King appearing on behalf of the plaintiff, 
and Gary B. Ferguson appearing on behalf of the defendant. 
Plaintiff's counsel represented to the Court that the 
plaintiff did not oppose defendant's First Motion in Limine. 
Plaintiff's counsel then argued plaintiff's Motion for 
Continuance of Motion for Summary Judgment filed pursuant to Rule 
56(f), Utah Rules of civil Procedure. The Court denied 
plaintiff's Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue the Motion for Summary 
Judgment for reasons set forth hereafter. Thereafter, both 
counsel argued defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, The 
Court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment for the 
reasons set forth hereafter. 
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Court makes the following statement of its 
findings: 
1.) With the granting of the defendant's First Motion 
in Limine, the sole basis remaining for the plaintiff to assert 
liability against defendant Wasatch Manor was a failure by 
Wasatch Manor to have a fire sprinkling system in place on the 
tenth floor of Wasatch Manor on February 7, 1990, the date of the 
fire. 
2.) The defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
asserted that summary judgment should be granted on the grounds 
that the plaintiff cannot prove a prima facie case with respect 
to the fire sprinkling system. The missing elements were proof 
as to the cost of the fire sprinkling system and the financial 
ability of the defendant to pay for the system. The defendant's 
motion for summary judgment did not challenge any other element 
of the plaintiff's negligence claim. 
3.) The only evidence the plaintiff had with respect 
to cost of installing a fire sprinkling system was testimony of 
Burton Miller, the manager of Wasatch Manor. During a discovery 
deposition, Mr. Miller testified that after the fire, Wasatch 
Manor obtained a general estimate in the amount of $185,000.00 to 
$200,000.00 as the cost of installing a fire sprinkler system. 
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The plaintiff had no other evidence of the cost of installing a 
fire sprinkler system. 
4.) Defendant objected, pursuant to Rule 407, Utah 
Rules of Evidence to the admissibility of this testimony arguing 
that it was excluded as a subsequent remedial measure. 
5.) Counsel for the parties stipulated to the fact 
that the Uniform Building Code in effect at the time Wasatch 
Manor was built did not require the installation of a sprinkler 
system. 
6.) Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion sought a continuance 
in order to obtain expert testimony to establish that a fire 
sprinkling system in Wasatch Manor would have been effective. 
Counsel for the defendant conceded that a fire sprinkler system 
would have been effective and agreed to limit the scope of the 
motion for summary judgment solely to the question of whether the 
plaintiff had presented a prima facie case as to whether, under 
the circumstances of this case, Wasatch Manor was negligent for 
failing to install a sprinkler system prior to February 7, 1990. 
Counsel for the plaintiff accepted that stipulation, thereby 
making plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion moot. 
Based upon the foregoing, the court hereby orders, 
judges and decrees: 
1. That plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion is denied on 
the grounds of the party's stipulation, thereby making the motion 
moot, and further on the grounds that the motion did not set 
forth facts that would be essential for the plaintiff to oppose 
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defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment was based upon a lack of evidence of cost and 
financial ability. Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) motion sought 
additional time to establish facts that would show that a fire 
sprinkling system would have been effective. Further, the Court 
notes that the complaint has been pending for over 17 months at 
the time defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard. 
Expert designation date was set of August 31, 1991. Discovery 
cutoff date was set as December 31, 1991 and continued to 
February 28, 1992. On March 23, 1991, the case was set for trial 
to commence on May 11, 1992. The plaintiff has had more than 
ample time to prepare her prima facie case and be in a position 
to withstand the Motion for Summary Judgment filed after the 
discovery cutoff date. This is an additional basis for denial of 
the Rule 56(f) motion. The Court further finds that the 
affidavits in support of plaintiff's Rule 56 motion were not 
timely filed, thereby proving an additional basis for denial of 
the Rule 56(f) motion. 
2.) That defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted on the grounds that the plaintiff has not established a 
prima facie case of negligence against the defendant. In order 
to prove a prima facie case against the defendant Wasatch Manor 
on the issue of the fire sprinkling system, the plaintiff must 
show, as an element of her proof, the cost of installing the 
sprinkling system and, separately, the ability for Wasatch Manor 
to pay those costs. Failure to prove either fact prevents the 
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plaintiff from establishing a prima facie case. The only 
evidence presented to the court by the plaintiff on the issue of 
cost of installing the sprinkler system was the testimony of 
Burton Miller set forth above. That testimony is not admissible 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 407, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The testimony does not fall within the feasibility exemption to 
Rule 407* The feasibility exemption applies only if there is an 
issue as to whether or not the fire sprinkling system physically 
can be installed. Rule 407 evidences a strong public policy in 
favor of encouraging tortfeasors to review the circumstances 
surrounding an accident to determine whether or not something can 
be done to prevent further accidents from happening. This public 
policy requires the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures undertaken by the tortfeasor, unless the activity falls 
within one of the listed exemptions. The efforts of Wasatch 
Manor in obtaining a bid on the installation of a fire sprinkling 
system is subsequent remedial conduct that does not fall within 
any of the exceptions listed in Rule 407. 
The only evidence of Wasatch Manor's ability to pay for 
the fire sprinkler system was that Wasatch Manor remodeled the 
building in 1984 at the approximate cost of $500,000. This 
evidence, by itself, is insufficient, as a matter of law, to show 
Wasatch Manor's ability to pay for a fire sprinkler system prior 
to February 7, 1990. Therefore, the plaintiff could not prove, 
at the time of the Motion for Summary Judgment this portion of 
her prima facie case. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court orders that 
judgment be entered in favor of the defendant, for no cause of 
action, and that the defendant be awarded its costs incurred 
pursuant to Rule 54(d) Utah/Rules of Civil Procedure. 
1992. 
BY "THEr-COU 
*\J XVU.JLC «J-2\VAJ L U A V U 1 C 9 \J JL V « i V J , i T 
DATED this Q3 day of /v7^//^ , 
KZCF A 
HpNORABLE RICHARD mFtfO&t^'*' 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM: 
V3V 
GA^ B\ FERGUSON 
Attorney for Defendant 
s. 
BRIAN S. KING 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501, mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument this day of , 
1992 by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Ronald E. Dalby, Esq. 
Matthew J. Storey, Esq. 
Brian King, Esq. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE 
4516 S. 700 E., #280 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
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RULE 407, URE 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- J.P.W. Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
mon, 560 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1977). (Utah 1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 1986). 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703 (1965); 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev 937.
 t r i a l > o r f l l i n g 0f necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 
" c i S - 49 CJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
 f *f™ to «™ , n o t i c e °ff aPPl i c a t i™ J * d e -
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to lia- fault Judgment where notice is required only 
bility against defaulting defendant, 8 A.L.R.3d by custom, 28 A.L.R 3d 1383. 
1070, Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendants right to notice and Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment <&> 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Affidavit. 
—Contents. 
—Corporation. 
—Experts. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. 
Resting on pleadings. 
—Objection. 
—Sufficiency. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. 
—Superseding pleadings. 
—Unpleaded defenses. 
—Verified pleading. 
—Waiver of right to contest. 
—When unavailable. 
Exclusive control of facts. 
—Who may make. 
Affirmative defense. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
—Standard of review. 
Attorney's fees. 
Availability of motion. 
Cross-motions. 
Damages. 
Discovery. 
Disputed facts. 
Evidence. 
—Facts considered. 
—Improper evidence. 
—Proof. 
—Weight of testimony. 
Improper party plaintiff. 
Issue of fact. 
—Corporate existence. 
—Deeds. 
—Lease as security. 
Judicial attitude. 
Motion for new trial. 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 408 
Rule 407, Subsequent remedial measures. 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would 
have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures 
is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with 
the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent 
measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, con-
trol, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeach-
ment. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable 
to Rule 51, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Limited admissibility. eluded for purpose of proving negligence and 
Inserts contained in drug packages contain- there was sufficient evidence to support jury 
ing instructions and warnings of possible side verdict on negligence grounds. Barson ex rel. 
effects were admissible where the inserts were Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 
admitted for purpose of proving a defect in (Utah 1984). 
drug under strict liability and specifically ex-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence injury warning measures undertaken by defen-
§§ 275, 628. dant, 38 A.L.R.4th 583. 
C.J.S. — 31A CJ.S. Evidence § 291; 65A Key Numbers. — Evidence *» 140, 219(1); 
C.J.S. Negligence §§ 224, 225. Negligence *» 131. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of evidence of post 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accept-
ing or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromis-
ing or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either 
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the 
claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise 
negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require the exclu-
sion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in 
the course of compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclu-
sion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or 
prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an 
effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is Cross-References. — Offer of judgment, 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 68. 
to Rules 52 and 53, Utah Rules of Evidence Release or settlement of personal injury 
(1971) but is broader to the extent that it ex- claim, rescission or disavowal of, § 78-27-32. 
eludes statements made in the course of negoti-
ations. 
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